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Suitability Obligations Applicable to Securities and Annuities
Christine Lazaro 1
Benjamin P. Edwards 2
Brokers are subject to different regulatory obligations depending
on the type of product being recommended to a customer.
Generally, brokers are subjected to overlapping oversight and are
regulated at both the federal and state level. This oversight
becomes even further complicated when a broker sells a product
that spans multiple regulatory schemes such as certain annuities,
which may be both insurance and securities products.
This article describes a broker’s suitability obligations under the
new suitability rule when making recommendations which are
covered by that rule. Next, it describes the additional obligations
that a broker has when making a recommendation of a variable
annuity. Last, it describes the obligations a broker has when
recommending an equity-indexed annuity, which has sometimes
been viewed as both a security and insurance and sometimes solely
as an insurance product.
I. Broker’s Obligations When Making Recommendations
When doing business with retail customers, brokers and brokerage
firms are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as
by state statutes and regulations. In addition, brokers and
brokerage firms are regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (“FINRA”), a self-regulatory organization and are
subject to the rules issued by FINRA.
A. The Suitability Rule
Brokers and brokerage firms must adhere to a suitability standard
which is premised primarily on FINRA Rule 2111, and requires
that a Broker have a reasonable basis for believing that a
recommendation of a security or an investment strategy is
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“suitable” for a customer. Rule 2111 replaced NASD Rule 2130,
and went into effect on July 9, 2012.
Rule 2111(a) provides that:
A member or an associated person must have a reasonable
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the
customer, based on the information obtained through the
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer's investment profile. A customer's
investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the
customer's age, other investments, financial situation and
needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment
experience, investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk
tolerance, and any other information the customer may
disclose to the member or associated person in connection with
such recommendation. 3
The Supplementary Materials to Rule 2111 set forth the general
principles of the rule, which state:
Implicit in all member and associated person relationships with
customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for fair
dealing. Sales efforts must therefore be undertaken only on a
basis that can be judged as being within the ethical standards
of FINRA rules, with particular emphasis on the requirement
to deal fairly with the public. The suitability rule is
fundamental to fair dealing and is intended to promote ethical
sales practices and high standards of professional conduct. 4
There are three components to the suitability obligation set forth in
Rule 2111, the reasonable-basis obligation; the customer-specific
obligation; and quantitative suitability.

3.

FINRA Rule 2111(a),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display main.html?rbid=2403&element id=9859. (A
“member” is a brokerage firm and an “associated person” is a Broker).
4
FINRA Rule 2111.01.
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Reasonable-basis suitability requires the broker to reasonably
believe that the recommendation is suitable for at least some
customers. 5 Customer-specific suitability requires the broker to
reasonably believe the recommendation is suitable for the
particular customer. 6 Lastly, quantitative suitability requires the
broker, who has discretion or de facto control over the customer’s
account, to reasonably believe that a series of recommended
transactions are not excessive and unsuitable for a customer when
taken together. 7
In drafting Rule 2111, FINRA for the first time explicitly included
investment strategies within the ambit of the rule, and mandated
that the term be read broadly to include explicit recommendations
to hold securities. 8
B. Regulatory Notices on Suitability
FINRA issued a series of regulatory notices to provide guidance to
its members following the adoption of Rule 2111. The regulatory
notices presented a series of questions and answers, expanding the
information provided through supplementary materials to the rule.
In Regulatory Notice 11-25, FINRA answered the question, “What
is the scope of the term ‘strategy’ as used in FINRA Rule 2111?” 9
FINRA responded that “the rule would cover a recommendation to
purchase securities using margin or liquefied home equity or to
engage in day trading, irrespective of whether the recommendation
results in a transaction or references particular securities.” 10
FINRA also provided an example of the type of circumstance that
would create an explicit recommendation to hold a security. “The
rule would apply, for example, when an associated person meets
with a customer during a quarterly or annual investment review
5

See FINRA Rule 2111.05(a).
See FINRA Rule 2111.05(b).
See FINRA Rule 2111.05(c).
8
See FINRA Rule 2111.03.
9
See Regulatory Notice 11-25, “Know Your Customer and Suitability: New
Implementation Date for and Additional Guidance on the Consolidated FINRA Rules
Governing Know-Your-Customer and Suitability Obligations,” Q7 & A7, p. 6, May 2011,
available at http://finra.complinet.com/net file store/new rulebooks/f/i/finra 11-25.pdf.
10
Id.
6
7
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and explicitly advises the customer not to sell any securities in or
make any changes to the account or portfolio.” 11 However,
FINRA made clear that the suitability obligation is not implicated
by a broker remaining silent; and the rule does not create an
ongoing duty to monitor the account.12
FINRA issued a follow-up notice in May 2012, prior to the
effective date of Rule 2111. In Regulatory Notice 12-25, FINRA
answered the question, “What does it mean to act in a customer’s
best interests?”:
In interpreting FINRA’s suitability rule, numerous cases
explicitly state that “a broker’s recommendations must be
consistent with his customers’ best interests.” The suitability
requirement that a broker make only those recommendations
that are consistent with the customer’s best interests prohibits a
broker from placing his or her interests ahead of the
customer’s interests. Examples of instances where FINRA and
the SEC have found brokers in violation of the suitability rule
by placing their interests ahead of customers’ interests include
the following:
►

►

►

►

►

11
12

A broker whose motivation for recommending one
product over another was to receive larger
commissions.
A broker whose mutual fund recommendations
were “designed ‘to maximize his commissions
rather than to establish an appropriate portfolio’
for his customers.”
A broker who recommended “that his customers
purchase promissory notes to give him money to
use in his business.”
A broker who sought to increase his commissions
by recommending that customers use margin so
that they could purchase larger numbers of
securities.
A broker who recommended new issues being
pushed by his firm so that he could keep his job.

Id.
Id.; see also Q8 & A8.
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►

A broker who recommended speculative securities
that paid high commissions because he felt
pressured by his firm to sell the securities.

The requirement that a broker’s recommendation must be
consistent with the customer’s best interests does not obligate
a broker to recommend the “least expensive” security or
investment strategy (however “least expensive” may be
quantified), as long as the recommendation is suitable and the
broker is not placing his or her interests ahead of the
customer’s interests.
Some of the cases in which FINRA and the SEC have found
that brokers placed their interests ahead of their customers’
interests involved cost-related issues. However, the cost
associated with a recommendation is ordinarily only one of
many important factors to consider when determining whether
the subject security or investment strategy involving a security
or securities is suitable. For example, the customer’s
investment profile is critical to the assessment, as are a host of
product or strategy-related factors such as the product’s or
strategy’s investment objectives, characteristics (including any
special or unusual features), liquidity, risks and potential
benefits, volatility and likely performance in a variety of
market and economic conditions. These are all important
considerations in analyzing the suitability of a particular
recommendation, which is why the suitability rule and the
concept that a broker’s recommendation must be consistent
with the customer’s best interests are inextricably
intertwined. 13
13
FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-25, “Suitability: Additional Guidance on FINRA’s New
Suitability Rule,” Q1 & A1, pp. 3-4, May 2012 (internal citations and footnotes omitted),
available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.
pdf. The following cases were cited by FINRA: Raghavan Sathianathan, Exchange Act
Rel. No. 54722, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2572, at *21 (Nov. 8, 2006); Scott Epstein, Exchange Act
Rel. No. 59328, 2009 SEC LEXIS 217, at *40 n.24 (Jan. 30, 2009) (“In interpreting the
suitability rule, we have stated that a [broker’s] ‘recommendations must be consistent with
his customer’s best interests.’”); Dane S. Faber, 57 S.E.C. 297, 310, 2004 SEC LEXIS 277,
at *23-24 (2004) (stating that a “broker’s recommendations must be consistent with his
customer’s best interests” and are “not suitable merely because the customer acquiesces in
[them]”); Wendell D. Belden, 56 S.E.C. 496, 503, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1154, at *11 (2003)
(“As we have frequently pointed out, a broker’s recommendations must be consistent with

5

In terms of defining “recommendation” under the new rule,
FINRA stated that its and the SEC’s prior guidance and
interpretations remain generally applicable.14
FINRA answered who a customer is for purposes of the suitability
rule stating, “a ‘customer’ clearly would include an individual or
entity with whom a broker-dealer has even an informal business
relationship related to brokerage services, as long as that individual
or entity is not a broker or dealer.” 15 FINRA made clear that the
suitability obligation applied to potential investors.16
FINRA also explained the scope of the reasonable-basis suitability
obligation. It is not sufficient that the investment be suitable for
some investors:
The reasonable-basis obligation is critically important because,
in recent years, securities and investment strategies that
brokers recommend to customers, including retail investors,
have become increasingly complex and, in some cases, risky.
Brokers cannot fulfill their suitability responsibilities to
customers (including both their reasonable-basis and customerspecific obligations) when they fail to understand the securities
and investment strategies they recommend. 17

his customer’s best interests.”); Daniel R. Howard, 55 S.E.C. 1096, 1100, 2002 SEC LEXIS
1909, at *5-6 (2002) (same), aff’d, 77 F. App’x 2 (1st Cir. 2003); Powell & McGowan, Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 933, 935, 1964 SEC LEXIS 497, at *3-4 (1964) (same); Dep’t of Enforcement v.
Evans, No. 20006005977901, 2011 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 36, at *22 (NAC Oct. 3, 2011)
(same); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Cody, No. 2005003188901, 2010 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 8,
at *19 (NAC May 10, 2010) (same), aff’d, Exchange Act Rel. No. 64565, 2011 SEC LEXIS
1862 (May 27, 2011); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Bendetsen, No. C01020025, 2004 NASD
Discip. LEXIS 13, at *12 (NAC Aug. 9, 2004) (“[A] broker’s recommendations must serve
his client’s best interests, and the test for whether a broker’s recommendations are suitable
is not whether the client acquiesced in them, but whether the broker’s recommendations
were consistent with the client’s financial situation and needs.”); Robin B. McNabb, 54
S.E.C. 917, 928, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2120, at *24 (2000), aff’d, 298 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
1990); Stephen T. Rangen, 52 S.E.C. 1304, 1311, 1997 SEC LEXIS 762, at *19 (1997);
Curtis I. Wilson, 49 S.E.C. 1020, 1022, 1989 SEC LEXIS 25, at *6-7 (1989), aff’d, 902
F.2d 1580 (9th Cir. 1990).
14
Id. at Q2 & A2 and Q3 & A3, pp. 4-5.
15
Id. at Q6 & A6, p. 6 (emphasis in the original).
16
Id.
17
Id. at Q22 & A22, p. 14.
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With respect to quantitative suitability, FINRA provided guidance
that the standards that established excessive trading under the
predecessor rule continue to provide a basis for establishing that
recommendations may be quantitatively unsuitable under the new
rule – turnover rate, cost-to-equity ratio, and in-and-out trading of
an account. 18
In December 2012, FINRA issued Regulatory Notice 12-55 to
clarify the scope of the terms “customer” and “investment
strategy” as discussed in Regulatory Notice 12-25. 19
In this notice, FINRA issued revised answers to the question, who
is a customer? Now, FINRA defined a customer to include “a
person who is not a broker or dealer who opens a brokerage
account at a broker-dealer or purchases a security for which the
broker-dealer receives or will receive, directly or indirectly,
compensation even though the security is held at an issuer, the
issuer’s affiliate or a custodial agent (e.g., “direct application”
business, “investment program” securities, or private placements),
or using another similar arrangement.” 20
With respect to potential investors, the suitability obligation would
only apply if the person becomes a customer. “Where, for
example, a registered representative makes a recommendation to
purchase a security to a potential investor, the suitability rule
would apply to the recommendation if that individual executes the
transaction through the broker-dealer with which the registered
representative is associated or the broker-dealer receives or will
receive, directly or indirectly, compensation as a result of the
recommended transaction.” 21
FINRA also clarified that the suitability rule applies only to
securities transactions and not to recommendations related to non-

18

Id. at Q23 & A23, p. 14.
See FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-55, “Suitability: Additional Guidance on FINRA’s
New Suitability Rule,” December 2012, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/net file store/new rulebooks/f/i/FINRANotice12 55.pdf.
20
Id. at Q6(a) & A6(a), p. 2.
21
Id. at Q6(b) & A6(b), p. 2 (emphasis in the original).
19
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securities transactions such as might arise in outside business
activities. 22
II. Broker’s Obligations When Recommending Annuities
Annuities pose a unique issue with respect to suitability
obligations. Certain annuities, e.g. fixed annuities, are not
securities and hence, the FINRA suitability obligation does not
apply to the recommendation to purchase a fixed annuity. Other
annuities, e.g. variable annuities, are securities and the FINRA
suitability obligations clearly apply. However, there are a third
category of annuities, equity-indexed annuities, which may or may
not be securities.
A. Suitability and Variable Annuities
In addition to Rule 2111, FINRA Rule 2330 also applies to sales of
variable annuities. 23
Rule 2330 outlines a broker’s responsibilities regarding deferred
variable annuities. In addition to complying with the suitability
obligations set forth in Rule 2111, the broker has further
obligations. Specifically, the broker must have a reasonable basis
to believe that “the customer has been informed, in general terms,
of various features of deferred variable annuities, such as the
potential surrender period and surrender charge; potential tax
penalty if customers sell or redeem deferred variable annuities
before reaching the age of 59½; mortality and expense fees;
investment advisory fees; potential charges for and features of
riders; the insurance and investment components of deferred
variable annuities; and market risk.” 24
22

Id. at Q10(a) & A10(a), p. 4.
“Deferred variable annuities have many unique features that make them complex
investments. In addition to the hybrid nature of deferred variable annuities (i.e., they contain
both securities and insurance features), most deferred variable annuities offer numerous
choices among a number of complex contract features.6 Moreover, the amount that will
accumulate and be paid to the investor pursuant to a deferred variable annuity will fluctuate
depending on the investment options that the investor chooses.” See NASD Notice to
Members 04-45, “Proposed Rule Governing the Purchase, Sale, or Exchange of Deferred
Variable Annuities,” June 2004, available at
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p003009.pdf.
24
FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(i).
23

8

In addition to ensuring that the customer has received material
information about the variable annuity, the broker must have a
reasonable basis to believe “the customer would benefit from
certain features of deferred variable annuities, such as tax-deferred
growth, annuitization, or a death or living benefit.” 25 The broker
also has to believe the annuity as a whole, including the underlying
subaccounts to which money has been allocated, as well as riders
and product enhancements, are suitable for the customer. 26
The rule also requires that a broker make a suitability
determination with respect to annuity exchanges, and requires the
broker to consider whether “the customer would incur a surrender
charge, be subject to the commencement of a new surrender
period, lose existing benefits (such as death, living, or other
contractual benefits), or be subject to increased fees or charges
(such as mortality and expense fees, investment advisory fees, or
charges for riders and similar product enhancements).” 27 Again,
the broker should consider whether the customer would benefit
from product enhancements and improvements. 28 The broker must
also consider whether any other deferred variable annuities had
been exchanged in the preceding 36 months.29
Like Rule 2111, Rule 2330 also sets forth the type of information a
broker should obtain from a customer prior to making a
recommendation: “information concerning the customer's age,
annual income, financial situation and needs, investment
experience, investment objectives, intended use of the deferred
variable annuity, investment time horizon, existing assets
(including investment and life insurance holdings), liquidity needs,
liquid net worth, risk tolerance, tax status, and such other
information used or considered to be reasonable by the member or
person associated with the member in making recommendations to
customers.” 30

25

FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(ii).
See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(A)(iii).
FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(i).
28
See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(ii).
29
See FINRA Rule 2330(b)(1)(B)(iii).
30
FINRA Rule 2330(b)(2).
26
27
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Although this rule applies to deferred variable annuities, it does
not apply to fixed annuities or equity-indexed annuities.
B. Defining Equity-Indexed Annuities
Insurance companies quietly introduced a new breed of annuity,
the equity-indexed annuity, in the mid-1990s. 31 These products
credit contract owners with returns based on the performance of
some index, such as the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial
Average. Because the products were most often tied to equity
market indexes, they were first known as equity-indexed annuities.
The products share characteristics with both fixed and variable
annuities. 32 Like a fixed annuity, equity-indexed annuities may
offer a minimum guaranteed interest rate and, under state
insurance law, the insurance company will generally guarantee a
certain portion of the premium paid. 33 Like a variable annuity, the
rate of return for an equity-indexed annuity will vary based on the
performance of a securities index, such as the S&P 500. 34
Unlike variable annuities, however, equity-indexed annuities
typically do not diminish in value if a market index declines in
value over a set period. 35 If the relevant index goes down during
the relevant time period, no deduction is taken from the value of
the annuity. 36 In exchange for this downside protection, some
equity-indexed annuities cap the amount that may be earned when
the index’s value goes up. 37 For example, if an index increased
6% in a year, the equity-indexed annuity might only permit a
maximum rate of return of 5%. Forecasting anticipated returns
31

See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release
Nos. 33-8996, 34-59221, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138-01, p. 8, Jan. 8, 2009. The product has also
been known as a fixed indexed annuity. For ease of reference, this Article refers to the
product as an “equity-indexed annuity.”
32.
See FINRA, “Equity-Indexed Annuities: A Complex Choice”, last updated 2010,
available at http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/equity-indexed-annuities a-complexchoice, see also SEC, “Investor Bulletin: Indexed Annuities”, April 2011, available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/secindexedannuities.pdf.
33
See FINRA, “Equity-Indexed Annuities: A Complex Choice.”
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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may be difficult because the insurance companies selling equityindexed annuities may reserve the right to alter the formulas by
which the investor’s gains will be calculated. 38
Insurance companies for the most part have quietly sold equityindexed annuities since their introduction in the mid-1990s without
registering them as securities. 39
C. Regulating Equity-Indexed Annuities
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Securities Act”)
expressly exempts annuities from coverage of the Act, stating that
the provisions of the Act do not apply to “[a]ny . . . annuity
contract or optional annuity contract, issued by a corporation
subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions,
of any State or Territory of the United States or the District of
Columbia.” 40 Notwithstanding this explicit language, the Supreme
Court first considered what Congress intended when it included
the term “annuity contract” in the Securities Act in 1959 in SEC v.
VALIC. 41 In VALIC, the Court considered whether a variable
annuity was exempt from the Securities Act, and held that it was
not exempt.
At the time VALIC was decided, variable annuities were new
products. Because the first variable annuity contracts appeared in
1952, 42 they did not exist when the Securities Act was adopted in
1933. The Court had to decide what Congress meant when it used
the term “annuity” in the Securities Act, at a time when only fixed
annuities had existed. 43
States treated variable annuities
38

Crediting formulas typically limit the amount of interest credited by imposing a variety of
terms. A “participation rate,” for example, limits the investor to a certain percentage of the
index’s performance. Some equity-indexed annuities may also cap the amount of interest an
investor may receive in any given year. See Id.
39
See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release
Nos. 33-8996, 34-59221, File No. S7-14-08, p. 9, January 8, 2009, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8996.pdf.
40
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8).
41
See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
42
Id. at 69.
43
See id. at 69.
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inconsistently, with some states treating variable annuities as
insurance and others not. 44 The Court examined the characteristics
of the variable annuity contracts to determine whether they shared
traditional insurance characteristics. 45 Historically, the annuities
that had been regulated under the insurance laws had been fixed
annuities, which did share the traits of traditional insurance
products. 46 The Court concluded that “the concept of ‘insurance’
involves investment risk-taking on the part of the company.” 47
Nevertheless, “absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable
annuity places all the investment risks on the annuitant, none on
the company.” 48 Accordingly, the Court held that variable
annuities were not exempted from the Securities Act. 49
Over time, the insurance companies continued to develop new
annuity products. In 1967, the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether a flexible-fund annuity was subject to the Securities Act in
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co. 50 The flexible-fund annuity
was an optional annuity plan which was similar to a variable
annuity. 51 In this case, the Court focused less on the shifting of
risk and more on “the character the instrument is given in
commerce.” 52 The Court examined how the flexible funds were
being sold to consumers and found that flexible funds were
competing with mutual funds and being sold to consumers under
the same value proposition of growth and professional
management as mutual funds. 53 In the view of the Court, “[i]t
seems eminently fair that a purchaser of such a plan be afforded
the same advantages of disclosure which inure to a mutual fund
purchaser under §5 of the Securities Act.” 54 Thus, the Court held

44

Id.
Id. at 71–73.
46
Id. at 69.
47
Id. at 71.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 73.
50
SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
51
Id. at 204.
52
Id. at 211.
53
Id.
54
Id.
45
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that the annuities were not exempt annuity contracts under the
Securities Act. 55
In the mid-1980s, the SEC promulgated Rule 151 to create a safe
harbor definition of annuity contracts or optional annuity contract
under §3(a)(8) of the Securities Act for new products entering the
market. 56 The rule was meant to ensure guaranteed investment
contracts were exempt from the definition as long as certain
conditions were met. Rule 151 codified the Court’s holdings in
VALIC and United Benefit by specifying that the insurance
company must assume the investment risk under the contract and
that marketing the annuity as an investment will forfeit the
Securities Act exemption.57
In 2008, the SEC sought to regulate equity-indexed annuities by
proposing Rule 151A, which would make it clear that the products
fell outside the safe harbor of Rule 151 and within the SEC’s
jurisdiction. 58 In 2009, the SEC’s rulemaking process concluded
and it adopted Rule 151A, which excluded from the definition of
“annuity contracts or optional annuity contracts,” a contract if:
(1) The contract specifies that amounts payable by the issuer
under the contract are calculated at or after the end of one or
more specified crediting periods, in whole or in part, by
reference to the performance during the crediting period or
periods of a security, including a group or index of securities;
and
(2) Amounts payable by the issuer under the contract are more
likely than not to exceed the amounts guaranteed under the
contract. 59
Shortly after the SEC adopted Rule 151A, American Equity
Investment Life Insurance Co. challenged the rule in the United
55

Id. at 212.
17 C.F.R. § 230.151.
57
Id.
58
See “Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts”, Securities Act Release
Nos. 33-8933, 34-58022; File No. S7-14-08, June 25, 2008, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/33-8933.pdf.
59
17 CFR § 230.151A (a)(1)–(2).
56
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States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 60 Although the court
held that the SEC had reasonably interpreted the exclusion for
“annuity contracts” as not exempting equity-indexed annuities, it
vacated the rule because the SEC had “failed to properly consider
the effect of the rule upon efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.” 61
Removing doubt that equity-indexed annuities could be regulated
under the Securities Act, the court found that equity-indexed
annuities were more like securities than annuities that traditionally
benefited from the § 3(a)(8) exemption. 62 Retail customers who
purchased equity-indexed annuities did not know their annual
returns until the end of the year resulting in variability in potential
return and risk. 63 As the court noted, “[b]y contrast, an annuity
contract falling under Rule 151’s exemption avoids this variability
by guaranteeing the interest rate ahead of time.” 64
Following the court’s decision, Congress weighed in on the matter
when it enacted Dodd-Frank. 65 Title IX, Section 989J, also known
as the Harkin Amendment, directs the SEC to treat certain annuity
contracts as exempt securities under the Securities Act if certain
conditions are met. This exemption covers equity-indexed
annuities as long as:
(1) the value of the indexed annuity does not vary according to
the performance of a separate account; . . . and
(3) the indexed annuity is issued in a state that has adopted the
Model Suitability Regulation or by an insurer that adopts and
implements practices on a nationwide basis for the sale of
annuity contracts that meet or exceed the NAIC Model
Suitability Regulation. 66
60

Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 176, 179.
62
Id. at 174.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989J, 124 Stat. 1376, 1949-50 (2010).
66
Fed. Ins. Office, “How to Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in
the United States”, p. 52, 2013.
61
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D. The NAIC Model Suitability Regulation
In 2000, NAIC 67 drafted a white paper recommending the
establishment of suitability standards for life insurance and
annuities. 68 At the time, six states had broad suitability standards
for annuity products. 69 These states prohibited brokers from
recommending a product with reasonable grounds to believe the
product was unsuitable for the customer.70 Some states provided
guidance on how to determine suitability, basing it on an inquiry
into criteria such as the customer’s objectives, financial situation,
and needs. 71 Yet most states lacked suitability requirements. 72
After drafting the white paper, NAIC also appointed a working
group to draft a model act and regulation.73
An early draft of the model regulation applied only to the sale of
annuities to seniors, resulting in the “Senior Protection in Annuity
Transactions Model Regulation.” 74 In 2006, NAIC expanded the
scope of the model regulation to apply to all annuity transactions,
and it was renamed the Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model
Regulation (the “Model Regulation”).75
67

“The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is the U.S. standardsetting and regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief insurance
regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories. Through the
NAIC, state insurance regulators establish standards and best practices, conduct peer
review, and coordinate their regulatory oversight. NAIC staff supports these efforts and
represents the collective views of state regulators domestically and internationally. NAIC
members, together with the central resources of the NAIC, form the national system of
state-based insurance regulation in the U.S.” See About the NAIC,
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm.
68
NAIC, “Suitability of Sales of Life Insurance and Annuities”, June 2000, (“NAIC White
Paper”], available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/SOS-LI.pdf. See also, NAIC,
“Suitability in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation”, LH-275-1, April 2010, (NAIC
Model Regulation), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf.
69
See e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-15.8 (2011); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-2-14(c)(5)
(2014); MINN. STAT. § 60K.14 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 72A.20 (2014); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
INS. § 2.16(6) (2014). NAIC White Paper, at 10–14.
70
NAIC White Paper, at 11–14.
71
Id.
72
NAIC Model Regulation, at LH-275-1.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
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The Model Regulation resembles the FINRA suitability standard.
It requires that a broker have “reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for the consumer on the basis
of the facts disclosed by the consumer as to his or her investments
and other insurance products and as to his or her financial situation
and needs, including the consumer’s suitability information.” 76 In
addition, the broker must have a reasonable basis for believing that
the consumer has received specific information about the annuity,
and that particular aspects of the annuity are suitable for the
consumer. 77
The Model Regulation defines “suitability
information” to include the following: (1) age; (2) annual income;
(3) financial situation and needs, including the financial resources
used for the funding of the annuity; (4) financial experience; (5)
financial objectives; (6) intended use of the annuity; (7) financial
time horizon; (8) existing assets, including investment and life
insurance holdings; (9) liquidity needs; (10) liquid net worth; (11)
risk tolerance; and (12) tax status.78
There is substantial variation in the adoption of the Model
Regulation. Some states have adopted the duties found in the
Model Regulation. 79 Several states have adopted the duties found
in a prior version of the Model Regulation, which define the
information that must be considered in determining the suitability
76

NAIC Model Regulation, § 6.A.
Id. § 6.A(1)–(4).
78
Id. § 5.I
79
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 26.775 (2011); CAL. INS. CODE § 10509.914 (West 2011);
COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4:4-1-11 (2011); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-432a-5 (2012);
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26-A, § 8403 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4554 (West 2013); 20129 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 608-610 (LexisNexis); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
18.01.09.015 (2013); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 3120.50 (2011); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r.
191-15.75(507B) (2012); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 40-1-14a (2013); 806 KY. ADMIN. REGS.
12:120 (2012); MD. CODE REGS. 31.09.12.04 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.4155
(West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.2032 (West 2013); 19-2 MISS. CODE R. § 18.06
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-8106 (2012); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-59A.3 (2013);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 224.4 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-34.2-03
(2011); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3901-6-13 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R. 836-080-0180 (2011); 11-5
R.I. CODE R. § 12:6; S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 69-29 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33A16 (2012); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1115.051 (West 2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 590230 (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-23-390 (2012); W. VA. CODE R. § 114-11B-5
(2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628-347 (West 2012).
77
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of the transaction less specifically and require less disclosure about
the annuity. 80 One state adopted the original version of the Model
Regulation as it applied only to senior consumers,81 and other
states have adopted some variation of a suitability standard. 82
Only New Mexico has not adopted any suitability standards to
govern annuity sales. 83
The Harkin Amendment assumed that by June 16, 2013, states
would have adopted the Model Regulation. However, as outlined
above, only about two-thirds of the states have done so. Presently,
it is unclear whether the SEC will seek to exercise regulatory
responsibility over equity-indexed annuities in those states that
have not adopted the Model Regulation.
While the sale of an equity-indexed annuity would likely be
subject to the Model Regulation as opposed to FINRA Rule 2111,
FINRA has made it clear the other transactions in connection with
the recommendation of equity-indexed annuity may be subject to
FINRA Rule 2111. “Moreover, all recommendations to liquidate
or surrender a registered security such as a mutual fund, variable
annuity, or variable life contract must be suitable, including where
such liquidations or surrender are for the purpose of funding the
purchase of an unregistered [Equity Indexed Annuity].” 84

80
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 482-1-137-.06 (2006); 054-00-082 ARK. CODE R. § 6 (LexisNexis
2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1243.03 (LexisNexis 2014); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-294.06 (2006); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-72-4 (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 11711
(2014); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 96.06 (2014); 02-031-917 ME. CODE R. § 6 (2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. §33-20-805 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-60-170 (2009); N.H. CODE ADMIN.
R. ANN. Ins. 305.05 (2009); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:25-17-7 (2006); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 627-3 (2010); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0780-01-86-.06 (2008); 14 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 5-45-40 (2007).
81
18 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1214-6.0 (2014).
82
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §4724(16) (2007); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 700-1.146
(2007); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 688A.455 (2006); 44-27 WYO. CODE R. § 11 (LexisNexis
1996).
83
The NAIC tracks adoption of the Model Regulation, and its information indicates that
New Mexico has not adopted the Model Regulation. NAIC Model Regulation, at LH-275-6.

84

See NASD Notice to Members 05-50, “Equity-Indexed Annuities: Member
Responsibilities for Supervising Sales of Unregistered Equity-Indexed Annuities,” p. 5,
August 2005, available at
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p014821.pdf.

17

III. Conclusion
This article contains an overview of some of the regulations that
may apply when Brokers recommend that their clients purchase
securities or different types of annuities. For cases involving
annuities, much depends on the particular type of annuity at issue.
While the general suitability rule laid out in FINRA Rule 2111
applies to transactions involving securities, additional FINRA or
state-specific regulations may apply if a broker recommends a
variable annuity or an equity-indexed annuity.
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